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Zeldovič’s article “On Russian Dative Reflexive Constructions: Accidental or 
Compositional” is very interesting. It contains a good deal of insightful observations and is 
painstakingly argued. Its research object is the Russian dative reflexive construction (DRC) 
like Ивану не работается ‘Ivan does not feel like reading’. The aim of the article is to show 
that the DRC is fully compositional.    
 Like many other works by Zeldovič, the article is written from the radical-pragmatic 
perspective and constitutes a very good illustration of this trend in linguistic research. The 
language material that it analyzes has often been investigated within more traditional 
frameworks, especially in Russian linguistics, which makes Zeldovič’s novel approach to the 
old problem particularly interesting. In this short note I would like (by way of  discussion) to 
address two problems connected not so much with the DRC itself as with methodological 
issues concerning compositionality. I will dwell on two aspects: on the question of how we 
understand the very concept of compositionality, and what instruments we employ to 
demonstrate it.  
 
1. What is compositionality? 
 
According to the principle of compositionality, otherwise known as Frege’s principle, 
the meaning (and other properties) of a complex expression are a function of the meaning 
(and other properties) of its parts and of the way they are syntactically combined. 
Compositional analysis is a very powerful tool allowing to reduce the inventory of language 
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entities, which is extremely important from the methodological point of view. That is why 
Zeldovič’s attempt to provide a compositional account of the DRC is definitely praiseworthy, 
the more so that the construction itself has long been considered very thorny and has raised 
many questions.      
My point of departure is that if some linguistic entity is fully compositional, then in no 
place of linguistic description are we going to refer to its existence. Only in such a case is it 
possible to say that we have managed to reduce the inventory of language entities. It seems to 
me that it is this feature that is decisive in establishing the borderline between 
compositionality or its absence. I consider this understanding of compositionality so 
important as to insist that the term be used only in this sense.        
We say, for instance, that the combination большой камень ‘a big stone’ is 
compositional as all of its properties stem from the properties of its component parts and the 
way they are combined, the properties being manifested independently of this combination. 
Hence there is no necessity to include it in the lexicon of Russian. If it turns out that at some 
point of linguistic description it will be necessary to state that a phenomenon is realised in this 
combination in a SPECIAL WAY, unlike in expressions such as, большой забор ‘a big fence’ or 
маленький камень ‘a little stone’, then it will mean that a property of the combination has 
been revealed which is not fully determined by the properties of its component parts, and that 
the combination manifests a certain degree of idiomaticity. In this case we will not be able to 
exclude the expression большой камень from the description of Russian, and we will have no 
right to treat it as fully compositional.   
From this perspective the compositionality of the DRC would mean that it is not 
necessary to include it among the constructions of Russian. At certain points of his article 
Zeldovič seems to endorse this view, e.g. when he states that a compositional account “helps 
to reduce the number of grammatical entities”. I interpret this statement as suggesting that 
Zeldovič’s description allows the DRC to be excluded from the inventory of Russian 
constructions as it does not display any specific properties.     
However, other formulations used by the author seem to testify to a certain fluctuation 
in his interpretation of compositionality. Asserting that reduction of volitionality occurs in a 
specific way in the DRC, that it is grammaticalized in the DRC, and other statements of this 
kind, in my opinion undermine the compositionality of the DRC if it is to be understood in the 
way described above and make it impossible for the construction to be left out of linguistic 
description whereby “the number of grammatical entities” can be reduced.  
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In actual fact, what the article proves is not the compositionality of the DRC but 
something else. What I consider a valuable contribution is its success in demonstrating that 
the DRC is less idiomatic than has hitherto been assumed. Those of its properties which are 
discussed in the article ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE POTENTIAL OF THE ELEMENTS OF THE 
CONSTRUCTION. Rather than call it compositionality I would refer to this state of affairs as the 
semantic and pragmatic MOTIVATION of the construction. The semantics of the DRC is not 
arbitrary in the same sense in which the meaning of the idiom седьмая вода на киселе (‘very  
distant relative to somebody’,  literally: ‘seventh water on the sweet-sour drink’ is  arbitrary, 
but is motivated by the meaning of its components. The fact that DRC has some construction-
specific grammatical elements (the marker -ся, the dative case of the subject) rather than 
others is by no means accidental. Their meaning goes hand in hand with the meaning of the 
construction. But it still does not mean that the DRC should be denied the status of an 
independent entity of the Russian language, as in the case of the combination большой 
камень ‘a big stone’. For analogies let us look into the area of lexical semantics.              
It is well-known that the departure from compositionality (i.e. the degree of 
idiomaticity) can be more or less extensive. The more specific the behavior of a particular 
entity, the higher the degree of its non-compositionality. Thus, the above-mentioned idiom 
седьмая вода на киселе is highly non-compositional given that the meaning of all of its 
components are detached from that of ‘a distant relative’. The expression высокая 
температура ‘high temperature’ is compositional to a considerably higher, yet still non-
maximal degree. Both of its components carry one of their characteristic meanings; 
nevertheless the combination must not be treated as completely free. The meaning of high 
degree with reference to the word температура ‘fever’ is expressed by the adjective 
высокий ‘high’, but not by other adjectives with a similar meaning. (cf. тяжелая болезнь 
‘heavy illness', but not *тяжелая температура ‘heavy fever’, глубокое отчаяние ‘deep 
despair’, but not *глубокая температура ‘deep fever’ etc.). What is  significant here is the 
fact that although the combinability of these words is restricted, it is often semantically 
motivated. The adjective высокий ‘high’ in its basic meaning points to some high degree of 
the parameter of height (высокий дом ‘a high house’). Thus it can naturally combine with 
names of parameters, e.g., высокое давление ‘high pressure’, высокая цена ‘high price’, 
мощность ‘power’, надежность ‘probability’, скорость ‘speed’, степень ‘degree’. At the 
same time, there are kinds of parameters which do not collocate with высокий, e.g. *высокий 
вес ‘high weight’, *высокая длина ‘high length’. Thus the choice of the adjective as the 
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carrier of the meaning of high degree to go with the word температура appears to be highly 
motivated semantically, though it still does not make the combination fully compositional.  
I shall draw yet another analogy, a more grammar-oriented one. As we know, the verb 
прибивать ‘to nail’ has instrumental valency, which is encoded with instrumental case: 
прибивать топориком ‘to nail with a little hatchet’. This agrees perfectly with the potential 
of the instrumental case, which is often used to express instrumental meaning. However, 
although the general tendency of verbs of action is to appear in instrumental constructions, 
and although the instrumental case is typically employed in them, we cannot manage without 
specifying the instrumental valency in the dictionary entry прибивать and without indicating 
the instrumental case as its encoding. The problem is that not all action verbs have 
instrumental valency, and it is not always encoded with instrumental case1. For instance, the 
verb приклеивать ‘to glue’, which belongs to the same class of verbs of attachment, does not 
go with an instrument (as noted by Apresjan, who distinguishes the role of the 
tool/instrument, i.e., the object which is used in the performance of the action and which is 
durable, as in  прибивать топориком / камнем  ‘to nail with a little hatchet / with a stone’ 
*приклеивать кисточкой *‘to glue with a brush’, from the role of the means which 
represent expendable resources, as in прибивать маленькими гвоздями ‘to nail with small 
nails’, приклеивать синтетическим клеем / клейкой лентой ‘to glue with a synthetic glue / 
with a scotch’). On the other hand, in the expressions of the type писать на компьютере ‘to 
type on a computer’, считать на счетах ‘to count with an abacus’. стрелять из винтовки 
‘fire a rifle’ etc. the instrument is not expressed by the instrumental case, but by the 
preposition на or из. Thus, if the properties of the instrumental case unequivocally pointed to 
its capacity to express instrumental valency with the verb прибивать ‘to nail’, but not with 
the verb приклеивать ‘to glue’ and many other similar verbs, it would be possible to state 
that the construction прибивать + INSTRUMENTINS is fully compositional. As it is difficult 
to expect the properties of the instrumental case to be described in this way, it has to be 
concluded that the construction does not appear to be fully compositional, even though its 
properties match the properties of its components quite well.   
 
2. On ways to demonstrate compositionality 
 
                                                 
1 Ю. Д. Апресян. Трехуровневая теория управления: лексикографический аспект. В кн.: Ю.Д.Апресян, 
И.М.Богуславский, Л.Л.Иомдин, В.З.Санников. Теоретические проблемы русского синтаксиса. 
Взаимодействие грамматики и словаря. «Языки славянской культуры», М., 2010, с. 328-329. 
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Whether we call Zeldovič’s account a demonstration of compositionality or of 
semantic-pragmatic motivation, its essence does not alter. It is claimed that the meaning of a 
DRC is fully derivable from the meaning of its parts. Here we will comment on the way in 
which this derivability is demonstrated.   
Let us draw one more analogy between  grammatical and lexical semantics. In the area 
of lexical semantics we often encounter a clash of two approaches – pragmatic and semantico-
lexicographic. The supporters of the former strive to derive the observable differences in 
lexical meanings from contextual and pragmatic factors and thus to remove the necessity of 
postulating separate word meanings as autonomous entities. The supporters of the latter 
approach acknowledge the undesirability of postulating entities that could be done without, 
but nevertheless insist that in describing the object of analysis linguistic investigation should 
account for the full gamut of its diverse properties. If ALL relevant properties of the analyzed 
object can be DEDUCED from some circumstances external to this object (e.g. from the 
properties of the context or pragmatic principles), then, obviously, such an object should not 
be postulated. However, the snag is that, as far as we know, this  does not actually happen all 
that often. Researchers who maintain that some meanings of a relatively complex word could 
be reduced to one meaning often commit one of two errors (or both at once): they either 
ignore some relevant properties of lexemes which seem to defy explanation, or they do not 
take the very concept of deduction rigorously enough.   
   With reference to Zeldovič’s article I will leave aside the question of the 
completeness of the described properties: the author is right in saying that it is impossible to 
present all the properties in detail in a short article and refers the reader to his more 
comprehensive work. I shall focus on the second issue – the extent to which the 
considerations on derivability are convincing.      
Generally speaking, deliberations presented in linguistic studies are not always 
expected to comply with the requirements of logical rigor  (which is perhaps to be regretted). 
However, in an article which sets out to demonstrate that the properties of an entity CAN BE 
FULLY DEDUCED from the properties of other entities, such requirements are particularly 
relevant.   
 The logic of the argumentation provided by Zeldovič to demonstrate this derivability 
appears to me to be insufficiently rigorous. I shall try to show this using only one example, 
but of key importance. 
In section 6 (Why an irrational external force?) the author explains the emergence of 
the component ‘under the influence of an irrational external force’ in the meaning of the 
6 
 
construction. After showing in sections 4 and 5 that the reflexive marker is responsible for the 
reduction of the volitionality of the subject, the author says that what remains to be tackled is 
“the main issue: why should the reduction of volitionality in DRC be tantamount to the 
appearance of an irrational external force”. I shall reconstruct the logic of this reasoning, as I 
understand it, in four steps (A), (B), (C) and (D): 
(A) A priori there are two possibilities. I quote: “First, the fact that our desires and 
resources are gradable could be exploited, and the decrease of volitionality could mean that 
the subject has less desire and/or inner resources necessary for the action to be performed. 
Second, we can think of the desires and inner resources of the subject as if they were 
dependent on some external circumstances, i.e. their existence were caused by some irrational 
external force.” Afterwards these alternatives are compared from the point of view of the 
extent to which it is natural (probable) for such a complex of senses to be grammaticalized, 
i.e. to constitute the meaning of the grammatical construction DRC.  
(B) Alternative (1) is juxtaposed with Alternative (2): in the former the meaning of the 
DRC differs from the meaning of the corresponding non-reflexive construction only in 
quantitative terms:  what it added is the meaning ‘less desire and/or inner resources than 
necessary’, while in the latter the nature of the difference is qualitative.          
(C) Languages tend to grammaticalize qualitative meanings, not quantitative ones.  
(D) Therefore grammaticalization of the “quantitative meaning” (Alternative (1)) 
would be highly improbable. Alternative (2) lends itself far better to grammaticalization and 
consequently, it is this alternative that determines part of the meaning of the DRC.      
I will explain why the logic of this reasoning does not appear flawless to me (provided 
I have reconstructed it correctly).  
Step (A) equates the influence exerted on the subject by external circumstances with 
the influence exerted on him by some irrational external force. But on what grounds? Why 
should external influence on inner human resources necessarily take on the form of some 
irrational force of indeterminate nature? I can be deprived of the inner resources necessary to 
fall asleep through the influence of an external force of indefinite nature as well as by noisy 
neighbours who prevent me from falling asleep. However, it is only in the former case that it 
is possible to use the DRC and say Мне не спится ‘I do not feel like sleeping’. Consequently, 
the irrationality of the external force and the impossibility of personifying it undoubtedly 
enter into the meaning of the DRC but it is not clear how this fact follows from the subject’s 
being influenced by external circumstances. 
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For Step (B) the fundamental issue is the quantitative character of meaning in the case 
of (1) and the qualitative character in (2). To put it more precisely, what is at issue is whether 
the component that is introduced into the meaning of a non-reflexive construction in (1) and 
(2) is quantitative or qualitative in character.     
What is understood by quantitative meaning is the component ‘less desire and/or inner 
resources’ (‘reduction of volitionality’), which is present in (1) but not in (2). However, the 
presentation of the alternatives quoted in (A) is not entirely correct. Here, the first alternative 
retains the indicated quantitative component, and the second does not while in fact, to my 
mind, the alternatives exhibit far greater parallelism. If we compare alternatives which aspire 
to account for the meaning of the grammatical construction, we need to present them in a 
more comprehensive way so as to make the comparison viable. For instance, we can compare 
(1a) with (2a), or (1b) with (2b):  
(1a) desire and inner resources of the subject depend only on himself 
(2a) desire and inner resources of the subject depend on external circumstances  
(1b) the subject has less than necessary desire and/or inner resources due to factors 
intrinsic to himself 
(2b) the subject has less than necessary desire and/or inner resources due to the 
influence of external circumstances.   
However, (1b) should not be compared with (2a), as is actually done by the author. In 
any case, as we see, either (1) and (2) both contain the component of reduction of volitionality 
or neither of them does. It is not this component that differentiates them but the source of the 
decrease: it may be localized within the subject or be external to him. Thus further 
deliberations founded on the distinction between the quantitative (1) and the qualitative (2) do 
not have a solid basis.  
Step (B) discusses the tendency to grammaticalize qualitative rather than quantitative 
meanings. To support this view a number of examples are given. They demonstrate that even 
those grammatical categories which at first glance carry purely quantitative meanings, e.g. 
number and grammatical aspect, in actual fact also contain qualitative meanings. The 
justification of the qualitative character of the difference between singular and plural does not 
seem convincing to me, but this is not the issue at hand. I am ready to accept the claim that 
even if there is a quantitative component in the meaning of a grammatical category, there is 
most probably also something else there. One could, however, object to this by mentioning  
the category of comparative degree of adjectives and adverbs, the meaning of which, it seems, 
is restricted to ‘more than’, e.g., Иван умнее Петра ‘Ivan is wiser (more wise) than Peter’. In 
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any event, the author does not claim that there are no exceptions to this tendency. I have no 
criticism to make about the logic of Step (B).       
The final Step (D) is based on the distinction between the quantitative (1) and the 
qualitative (2) but on account of the dubiousness of the distinction, it falls short of going 
through. 
To conclude I will reiterate that in spite of the critical remarks made above, I find 
Zeldovič’s article particularly interesting and informative. It constitutes a bold attempt to 
derive the meaning of a complex syntactic construction (which has perplexed many linguists 
before him) from the properties of its components and from the relations that hold between 
them, interpreted in a broad pragmatic context. This perspective is undoubtedly very fruitful 
and certainly more challenging than an attempt to simply fix the meaning of the construction 
without pondering on its theoretical status.  
 
       
